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Abstract
The act of punishing unfair behavior by unaffected observers (i.e., third-party punish-
ment) is a crucial factor in the functioning of human societies. In everyday life, we
see different types of individuals who punish. While some individuals initiate costly
punishment against an unfair person independently of what other observers do (inde-
pendent punishers), others condition their punishment engagement on the presence
of another person who punishes (conditional punishers). Still others do not want to
partake in any sort of punishment (nonpunishers). Although these distinct behavioral
types have a divergent impact on human society, the sources of heterogeneity are
poorly understood. We present novel laboratory evidence on the existence of these
three types. We use anatomical brain characteristics in combination with stated
motives to characterize these types. Findings revealed that independent punishers
have larger gray matter volume in the right temporo-parietal junction compared to
conditional punishers and nonpunishers, an area involved in social cognition. Condi-
tional punishers are characterized by larger gray matter volume in the right dorsolat-
eral prefrontal cortex, a brain area known to be involved in behavioral control and
strategic reasoning, compared to independent punishers and nonpunishers. Finally,
both independent punishers and nonpunishers are characterized by larger gray mat-
ter volume in an area involved in the processing of social and monetary rewards, that
is, the bilateral caudate. By using a neural trait approach, we were able to differenti-
ate these three types clearly based on their neural signatures, allowing us to shed
light on the underlying psychological mechanisms.
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1 | INTRODUCTION
Human societies depend on the maintenance of elementary social
norms. Individuals' willingness to sanction norm violations at a per-
sonal cost enforce and/or even promote many of these social normsThomas Baumgartner and Jan Hausfeld contributed equally to this work.
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(e.g., Balliet, Mulder, & Van Lange, 2011; Fehr & Gächter, 2002;
Henrich et al., 2006). When group members have the opportunity to
engage in punishment, punishment suffers from the known problem
that some individuals are not willing to punish but still reap the bene-
fits from other individuals who do so, that is, second-order free-rider
problem (e.g., Fehr & Gächter, 2002; Panchanathan & Boyd, 2004). In
contrast to the vast literature on the first-order free-rider problem
(i.e., contributions to a public good) and the accompanying typology
of contributors (see e.g., conditional cooperation by Fischbacher,
Gächter, and Fehr (2001)), the existence of different types of pun-
ishers has barely been explored (two exceptions are Kamei (2014),
Molleman, Kölle, Starmer, and Gächter (2019), although several other
studies relate punishment to other behaviors or preferences,
e.g., Brañas-Garza, Espín, Exadaktylos, and Herrmann (2014), Falk,
Fehr, and Fischbacher (2005), Herrmann, Thöni, and Gächter (2008),
and Kurzban, DeScioli, and O'Brien (2007)).
This neglect on the punisher typology comes as a surprise, as it
seems rather natural to assume that there is heterogeneity in whether
other people's punishment choices affect the own punishment choice:
Some people want to ensure punishment is implemented and punish
independently of other people's punishment behavior. Without this
type of “independent punishers,” no punishment would occur and
norms would no longer be enforced. Other people might prefer to
condition their own punishment choice on whether another person
punishes. This “conditional punisher” type both potentially engages in
costly norm-enforcement, but by following others' actions, also risks
that punishment might not occur at all. When no one else does any-
thing, it is easier to feel that taking action is not necessary, or even
appropriate. This would be in line with the conceptual framework of
El Zein, Bahrami, and Hertwig (2019), who propose that the choice to
participate in collective decision-making minimizes the material and
psychological burden of an individual's responsibility. Most previous
studies on second-party punishment (two exceptions, i.e., Kamei,
2014, Molleman et al., 2019) and all studies on third-party punish-
ment have neglected conditional punishers, and instead just allowed
for two types (punishers or nonpunishers). Permitting conditional pun-
ishment could lead to more subjects sanctioning compared to only
binary yes-or-no punishment choices, that is, if people choose “condi-
tional punishment” when available but choose “no punishment” in a
binary choice. In contrast, the potentially strategic motives for partici-
pating in group-punishment are negligible for people who punish inde-
pendently of others' choices and people who would never punish,
that is, “nonpunishers.”
We aim to identify and characterize these different types of
third-party punishers (independent punishers, conditional punishers,
and nonpunishers) using an objective individual trait measure (struc-
tural brain characteristics) and using stated motives for further charac-
terization. Neuroanatomical differences are useful markers for
explaining individual variability because structural differences are rela-
tively stable over time in healthy adult subjects, demonstrate a high
individual specificity, and have been shown to be useful in predicting
individual differences in various traits, skills, and behaviors
(e.g., Kanai & Rees, 2011; Nash, Gianotti, & Knoch, 2015; Valizadeh,
Liem, Merillat, Hanggi, & Jancke, 2018). Importantly, neural traits are
objectively indexed, brain-based measures that are free from personal
biases and demand characteristics. Thus, behavioral performance is
left unadulterated by the act of completing trait measures and vice
versa.
We investigate punishment behavior in a third-party setting. The
two experimental studies on a similar typology of punishers, that is,
Kamei (2014) and Molleman et al. (2019), use a second-party setting
and find that people tend to mimic others' punishment decisions, even
though some people are unaffected by others' choices. Further, based
on the expressed level of the punishers' anger, Molleman et al. (2019)
suggest that “compared to independent punishers, preferences of
conditional punishers might perhaps reflect a more deliberative atti-
tude, with behavior relatively less likely to be driven by negative emo-
tions.” This suggestion strengthens the idea of the conditional
punisher acting strategically, and shows that different motives and
emotions affect the punishment decision. In contrast to second-party
punishment, third-parties' motives for punishment are less ambiguous:
Third-party punishment is often considered an altruistic or prosocial
act (e.g., Fehr & Fischbacher, 2004; Kurzban et al., 2007; Mathew &
Boyd, 2011), whereas antisocial motives such as retaliation often
drive second-party punishment (Carpenter & Matthews, 2012; Zhou,
Jiao, & Zhang, 2017). In fact, some researchers view the existence of
third-party punishment as the decisive factor for the enforcement of
social norms in human societies (Fehr & Fischbacher, 2004; Henrich
et al., 2006, 2010; Mathew & Boyd, 2011).
In our study, we developed a new third-party punishment para-
digm to identify three distinct behavioral punishment types (see
Figure 1). Participants form groups of four who observe a very unfair
behavior in an unrelated interaction between two other people, that
is, defecting after observing cooperating in a sequential prisoner's
dilemma. As a novel feature, the four potential punishers can indi-
cate their punishment choice for the norm violator by choosing
between three different options separating the following punish-
ment types: First, people who want to participate in the punishment
of unfair behavior, but only if another person punishes as well (“con-
ditional punisher”). By conditioning their behavior on others' punish-
ment decisions, these people strategically choose to share the
punishment burden, but also risk that the norm transgressor might
get away without punishment if no one takes the lead. Second, this
“letting the norm transgressor get away” would be unacceptable for
people who are willing to incur costs even if no one else punishes
(“independent punishers”). By doing so, these (potentially solitary)
altruistic punishers make sure that unfair behavior is sanctioned and
encourage a more cooperative environment (O'Gorman, Henrich, &
Vugt, 2009). Third, a last group of people does not punish at all
(“nonpunishers”).
Neural traits associated with certain functions provide inferences
of both how and why people differ. The current research thus sought
to answer the following: Can we identify the neural signatures under-
lying different behavioral types in third-party punishment behavior?
And, once identified, what do these signatures reveal about the psy-
chological processes driving these three types' punishment behavior?
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Third-party punishment has been explored in previous task-
dependent functional neuroimaging and brain stimulation studies.
These studies indicated that brain areas associated with social cogni-
tion (e.g., temporo-parietal junction, TPJ), emotion processing
(e.g., amygdala, insula), reward processing (caudate), and behavioral
control and strategic reasoning (dorsolateral regions of the prefrontal
cortex, DLPFC) play an important role (for reviews and meta-analyses,
see Bellucci, Camilleri, Iyengar, Eickhoff, & Krueger, 2020,
Buckholtz & Marois, 2012, Krueger & Hoffman, 2016). For example,
studies using task-dependent functional neuroimaging and brain stim-
ulation report that punishment decisions of third-parties rely on
mentalizing regions such as the TPJ. It has been suggested that the
TPJ plays a critical role in inferring the intentions of the perpetrator
and representing the victim's needs and appreciations (Baumgartner,
Gotte, Gugler, & Fehr, 2012; Buckholtz et al., 2008; Gerfo
et al., 2019; Ginther et al., 2016). Further, previous neuroimaging
studies also consistently show that DLPFC is implicated in the deci-
sion process. The DLPFC is activated when subjects decided to punish
and coded the amount of punishment assigned to the perpetrator
(Buckholtz et al., 2008; Ginther et al., 2016; Strobel et al., 2011;
Zhong, Chark, Hsu, & Chew, 2016). Moreover, inhibiting the func-
tion of the right DLPFC by rTMS reduced third-parties' punishment
of wrongful acts (Buckholtz et al., 2015). Finally, it has been
suggested that reward-related areas of the caudate (in particular
dorsal parts) play a role in motivating and reinforcing the punish-
ment act in third-parties (Baumgartner et al., 2012; Hu, Strang, &
Weber, 2015; Strobel et al., 2011), whereas emotion-related areas
(e.g., amygdala, anterior insula) are thought to detect the norm vio-
lation and to generate an aversive emotional response (Buckholtz &
Marois, 2012; Civai, Crescentini, Rustichini, & Rumiati, 2012;
Ginther et al., 2016).
Although these mentioned studies help to understand the neural
mechanism of third-party punishment, none of these studies differen-
tiated between independent punishers, conditional punishers, and
nonpunishers. Moreover, most of the previous studies focused on
task-dependent brain processes. Thus, we know little to nothing
about the distinct (task-independent) neural traits that help character-
izing these third-party punishment types.
(a)
(b)
F IGURE 1 Experimental paradigm and possible choice combinations. (a) Four potential third-party punishers are within one group (left side)
and are each endowed with 14 points. They observe an interaction between two other players in a sequential prisoner's dilemma, in which a first
mover transfers points and a second mover (sequentially) does not transfer points back (right side). The potential punishers can choose between
three different options on whether to sanction the defecting second mover in the PD: Option 1: I deduct points (i.e., to punish independently, red
button); Option 2: I join the deduction of points (i.e., to punish conditionally, green button) or Option 3: I do nothing (i.e., no punishing, gray
button). The third-party punishers were aware that (i) punishment only takes place if at least one of the third-party punishers decides to punish
independently (chooses Option 1), (ii) the costs for punishment (3 points in total) were shared equally among all players taking part in the
punishment (choose option 1 or 2), and (iii) the defecting second mover loses 4 points if punishment takes place. (b) Three potential choice
scenarios and associated consequences for punishment. In the left scenario, one subject decides to “deduct points” (Option 1, red) and no other
subject “joins.” Thus, the second mover of the PD is punished and the sole punisher has to pay the total costs of 3 points for punishment by
him/herself. In the middle scenario, one subject decides to “deduct points” (Option 1, red) and two subjects decide to “join” (Option 2, green).
Thus, the second mover is punished, and the total costs of 3 points for punishment are divided among the red and green subjects, that is, all three
pay 1 point. In the scenario on the right hand side, two subjects decide to “join” (Option 2, green), but no subject chooses to “deduct points”
(Option 1, red). Thus, the second mover does not get punished
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Based on the neuroimaging findings on third-party punishment
mentioned above and the discussed possible motives driving third-
party's punishment choice, we derive the following tentative hypothe-
ses. Among the regions playing a critical role in third-party punish-
ment, the DLPFC and the TPJ might be particularly interesting
candidates driving third-parties' punishment choice. The DLPFC is
known to play a critical role in behavioral control and strategic
decision-making (e.g., Baumgartner, Dahinden, Gianotti, &
Knoch, 2019; Gianotti, Nash, Baumgartner, Dahinden, & Knoch, 2018;
Soutschek, Sauter, & Schubert, 2015; Spitzer, Fischbacher,
Herrnberger, Gron, & Fehr, 2007; Steinbeis, Bernhardt, &
Singer, 2012; Yamagishi et al., 2016). We speculate that conditional
punishers have a more strategic nature which might be driven by a
larger DLPFC (i.e., larger gray matter volume) compared to the other
two types. Further, studies in the field of cooperation and prosocial
behavior have associated task-dependent and task-independent brain
characteristics of the TPJ with altruistic choices (e.g., Baumgartner
et al., 2019; Hare, Camerer, Knoepfle, & Rangel, 2010; Morishima,
Schunk, Bruhin, Ruff, & Fehr, 2012; Park et al., 2017). We hence spec-
ulate that independent punishers have a more altruistic nature/
inclination which might be driven by a larger TPJ (i.e., larger gray mat-
ter volume) compared to the two other types. Since the previous
studies only allow inferring tentative hypotheses, we run exploratory
analyses to investigate the neural traits of independent, conditional,
and nonpunishers, focusing on brain areas shown to be critically
involved in third-party punishment.
2 | MATERIALS AND METHODS
2.1 | Participants and procedure
We recruited 104 students from the University of Bern for participa-
tion in this study in the role of third-party punishers. Two of these
participants had to be excluded due to artifacts in the anatomical
brain data. Thus, we analyzed a final sample of 102 participants
(46 female, 56 male, average 23.34 years old with SD 2.89). Students
of economics, psychology, and social sciences were excluded from
participation to reduce the possibility of prior knowledge of the con-
cept of third-party punishment. We recruited participants for one
academic year. The goal was to reach a sample size of about 80–100
subjects since two recent methodological studies on fMRI research
concluded that sample sizes close to N = 80 (Geuter, Qi, Welsh,
Wager, & Lindquist, 2018) or N = 100 (Turner, Paul, Miller, &
Barbey, 2018) are required to reliably and reproducibly recover brain
regions with medium effect sizes. Data were analyzed after the col-
lection was complete. All participants in the role of third-party pun-
ishers were right-handed, nonsmokers, and reported no history of
psychological disorders or neurological or cardiovascular disease.
The study was approved by the local ethics committee and partici-
pants signed informed written consent prior to the participation in
the study. Subjects received a show-up fee of 40 Swiss francs and
the points that they earned during the experiment with a currency
conversion rate of 2 points (p) = 1 CHF. The experiment was
programmed in z-tree (Fischbacher, 2007) and subjects were rec-
ruited via ORSEE (Greiner, 2015). Neuroimaging (structural brain
data, see below) and behavioral data collections were conducted in
different sessions. Behavioral data collections were conducted in a
behavioral laboratory with 24 interconnected computer terminals.
Participants were randomly assigned to cubicles where they could
make their decisions in isolation from others. Before starting the
experiment, control questions ensured participants' understanding
of the game.
2.2 | Paradigm
The study used a newly developed version of a third-party punish-
ment paradigm. The third-party consisted of four subjects (potential
punishers) who observed an interaction between two other subjects
(first mover and second mover) who played a sequential prisoner's
dilemma (PD) game. Notably, the first and second mover in the PD
were present in the laboratory and were paid according to their deci-
sions and the decisions of the third-parties punishers (see below). The
first and second mover in the PD both received an initial endowment
of 5 points. Then, the first mover could decide whether to transfer
5 points to the second mover or to keep all the points. The second
mover learned about the first mover's decision and then had to decide
him/herself whether to transfer back 5 points or to keep all points
(see Figure 1a, right side). Notably, all transferred points are multiplied
by two, for example, if both players transfer points, both receive
10 points in total. If only one person transfers points, the transferring
person would receive 0 points while the person keeping the points
would receive 15 points. If neither person transfers points, both keep
5 points.
The four potential punishers learned about the underlying struc-
ture of the interaction between the first mover and second mover in
the PD. Each potential punisher received an initial endowment of
14 points. Their task was to decide whether they want to deduct
4 points from the second mover, in case the first mover decided to
transfer points and the second mover kept the points, that is, the first
mover cooperated, while the second mover defected. More specifi-
cally, they were asked: “Do you want to deduct 4 points from the sec-
ond mover?” As a novel feature of the paradigm, each potential
punisher could decide between the following three options that
allowed separating the three predicted punishment types: I deduct
points (Option 1, i.e., to punish independently); I join the deduction of
points (Option 2, i.e., to punish conditionally); I do nothing (Option 3, i.-
e., not to punish, see Figure 1a, left side).
Critically, the four potential punishers were aware of the follow-
ing consequences of the different options. They knew that 4 points
would be deducted from the defecting second mover in the PD if at
least one person chose Option 1 (i.e., to punish independently). This
punishment was not additive and one subject choosing Option 1 was
sufficient for punishment to be implemented, regardless of the num-
ber of punishers. Implementing punishment yielded a total cost of
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3 points, but this total cost would be shared equally among all players
who participate in the punishment act, that is, subjects who chose
either Option 1 (i.e., to punish independently) or Option 2 (i.e., to
punish conditionally). Therefore, the per subject cost to deduct
4 points from the second mover was 3 points, 1.5 points, 1 point,
and 0.75 points in Case 1, 2, 3, and 4 subjects participated in the
punishment act, respectively (see Figure 1b, left and middle). Impor-
tantly, if subjects chose Option 2 (i.e., to punish conditionally), but
no one chose Option 1 (i.e., to punish independently), punishment
was not implemented (Figure 1b, right). The potential punishers'
decision to deduct points was implemented only if the first mover
had decided to transfer points and second mover had refused to
transfer points. The first and second mover in the PD were aware
that a group of four potential punishers could deduct 4 points from
the second mover. The potential punishers were aware that the two
other subjects knew that only the second mover in the PD could be
punished.
2.3 | Ratings of unfairness and motives for the
punishment choice
After deciding on the punishment of the defecting second mover
(when the first mover cooperated), the potential punishers had to indi-
cate the perceived unfairness of the second mover's behavior (on a
5-point Likert-scale, 1 = very unfair, 5 = very fair). Additionally, the
potential punishers had to rate their agreement with eight motive
statements. The statements were taken partially from Balafoutas,
Grechenig, & Nikiforakis (2014) and self-created and aim to elicit
potential motives underlying the punishment choice. For example,
participants had to answer the following motive statements (for all
statements, please see Table S1): (1) My choice was the morally right
thing to do. (2) The second mover violated a social norm. (3) Deducting
points from the second mover does not help anyone. Participants had
to indicate how much they agreed with each motive statement
(5-point Likert-scale, 1 = no agreement, 5 = full agreement). Finally,
only conditional punishers had to rate their agreement with the fol-
lowing three motive statements thought to play a role for this type
(5-point Likert-scale, 1 = no agreement, 5 = full agreement): (1) I
wanted to help people deducting points by reducing the costs for
them. (2) I did not want to be the only person who deducted points.
(3) It was morally correct to support someone who chose to deduct
points.
2.4 | Acquisition of anatomical brain data
Anatomical brain data was acquired on a Siemens MAGNETOM Pri-
sma 3.0 Tesla whole-body scanner using a 64-channel head coil.
T1-weighted 3D-modified driven equilibrium Fourier transformation
(MDEFT) images were acquired from each subject (176 slices, field of
view: 256  256  176, slice thickness: 1 mm, no gap, repetition
time: 7.93 ms, echo time: 2.49 ms, flip angle: 16).
2.5 | Preprocessing of anatomical brain data
Anatomical brain data was preprocessed with the computational anat-
omy toolbox (CAT 12, version 1450, Dahnke, Yotter, & Gaser, 2013)
implemented in the statistical parametric mapping software (SPM
12, version 7487). CAT 12 is documented and freely available online
(http://www.neuro.uni-jena.de/cat/) and covers diverse morphomet-
ric methods. Here we focused on voxel-based morphometry (VBM)—a
well-established whole-brain technique capable of discovering subtle,
regionally specific changes in gray matter volume by averaging across
subjects. This method is based on high-resolution structural three-
dimensional magnetic resonance images, registered in standard space,
and is designed to find significant regional gray matter differences
throughout the whole brain by applying voxel-wise statistics within
the context of Gaussian random fields (Ashburner & Friston, 2000).
Preprocessing of the data involved spatial normalization (to a MNI
template), segmentation into gray matter (GM), white matter (WM),
and cerebrospinal fluid (CSF), modulation, and spatial smoothing with
a Gaussian kernel (full width at half maximum = 8 mm;
Ashburner, 2007; Ashburner & Friston, 2000, 2005). In detail, the seg-
mentation approach is based on an Adaptive Maximum A Posterior
technique without the need for a priori information of tissue probabil-
ities, uses a Partial Volume Estimation with a simplified mixed model
of at most two tissue types (Tohka, Zijdenbos, & Evans, 2004), and
applies a classical Markov Random Field approach, which incorporates
spatial prior information of adjacent voxels into the segmentation esti-
mation (Rajapakse, Giedd, & Rapoport, 1997). Finally, gray matter seg-
mentations are modulated by scaling with the amount of volume
changes due to spatial normalization, so that the total amount of gray
matter in the modulated image remains the same, as it would be in
the original image.
2.6 | Statistical analyses of psychometric data
Statistical analyses were run with the SPSS (version 25). See Section 3
for details about the statistical tests conducted, including independent
t-tests as well as univariate ANOVAs with between-subject factor
behavioral types (independent punishers, conditional punishers, and
nonpunishers). Results were considered significant at the level of
p <.05 (two-tailed), except for the eight motive statements all partici-
pants had to answer. Here, we applied a correction for multiple com-
parisons according to Bonferroni, resulting in a corrected p-value of
0.00625 (0.05/8). Thus, only findings reaching this p-value survive
Bonferroni correction. We use the abbreviation SD for standard devia-
tion. As effect size measure eta2 is reported, which is a measure of
explained variance.
2.7 | Statistical analyses of anatomical brain data
In order to explore whether the behavioral types can be characterized
by anatomical brain characteristics, we performed univariate analysis
BAUMGARTNER ET AL. 5
of variance (ANOVA) with between-subject factor behavioral types
(independent punishers, conditional punishers, and nonpunishers) on
the smoothed gray matter volume images in SPM 12. As is required
for volumetric brain analyses, age, gender, and individual brain size
were included in the design matrix as covariates of no interest to
model and thus regress out any effects correlated with these
covariates.
Given our a priori hypotheses (as outlined in the introduction), we
focused in our analyses of anatomical group differences on brain areas
playing a role in third-party punishment, including areas involved in
mentalizing (TPJ), emotion processing (amygdala, insula, and anterior
cingulate cortex), behavioral control and strategic decision-making
(middle frontal gyrus), and reward processing (caudate nucleus). To
this end, a bilateral mask comprising the amygdala, insula, anterior cin-
gulate cortex, the middle frontal gyrus, the caudate, and TPJ (see
below) was created, defined using the Automated Anatomical Labeling
Atlas (Tzourio-Mazoyer et al., 2002), and implemented using the WFU
Pickatlas toolbox in SPM 12 (Maldjian, Laurienti, Kraft, &
Burdette, 2003). For the anatomical definition of the bilateral TPJ, we
included the bilateral angular and superior temporal gyrus (posterior
to y = 40), because several recent meta-analyses have consistently
reported activation peaks from studies on mentalizing in this part of
the brain (Carter & Huettel, 2013; Van Overwalle, 2009). The same
anatomical mask of the TPJ was used for small volume correction in
previous studies on social decision-making (e.g., Hutcherson, Bush-
ong, & Rangel, 2015).
In order to control for multiple comparisons, we used nonpara-
metric permutation statistics based on threshold-free cluster
enhancement (TFCE, Smith & Nichols, 2009) as implemented in the
SPM 12 toolbox TFCE (version 201, http://dbm.neuro.uni-jena.de/
tfce/). The idea of the TFCE approach is to combine focal effects
with large voxel heights as well as broad effects (clusters). In con-
trast to common approaches that use cluster-based thresholding no
initial (and arbitrary) cluster-forming threshold is necessary. TFCE
takes a raw statistic image (e.g., t or f maps) and estimates a voxel-
wise metrics (the TFCE values) by combining spatially distributed
cluster size and height information. As recommended for volumetric
data, we applied a cluster-size weighting of E = 0.5 and a height
weighting of H = 2.0, and the Smith permutation method with
5,000 permutations (Smith & Nichols, 2009). Using voxel-level non-
parametric permutation testing (based on the estimated TFCE
values), voxel-wise p values are computed, which are family-wise
error (FWE) corrected. All analyses in the manuscript report FWE-
corrected (at p <.05) effects across the whole brain (whole-brain
FWE corrected) or across the small volume mask defined above
(SV-FWE corrected). In case of significant (FWE-corrected) effects
in the univariate ANOVA (see above), we extracted gray matter vol-
ume values from regions demonstrating anatomical differences,
regressed out age, gender and individual brain size (the covariates
of no interest), and conducted post-hoc pairwise comparisons in
SPSS (version 25) in order to explore the direction and specificity of
the discovered anatomical differences between the three behav-
ioral types.
2.8 | Discriminant analyses of motive statements
and anatomical brain data
Finally, in order to get a more integrative view of all variables (struc-
tural brain characteristics and motive statements) characterizing the
three types, we employed discriminant analyses. Discriminant ana-
lyses allow examining how well each individual subject can be classi-
fied into different types, based on motives, structural brain
characteristics, or both. For that purpose, discriminant analyses deter-
mines the most parsimonious way to separate the types and discards
predictors, which add little to the discrimination of the types. We use
a stepwise estimation using Wilks' lambda for the inclusion of predic-
tors (motives or structural brain characteristics or both), that is, in
each step the predictor minimizing Wilk's lambda enters if it explains
sufficient additional variance. The discriminant analyses involve deriv-
ing linear combinations of the included predictors, that is, discriminant
functions, which yield coefficients that can be used to calculate a
score for a respective discriminant function. The magnitude of the
standardized coefficients indicate how strongly the predictors affect
the score. Based on these estimated discriminant functions, individual
discriminant scores for every subject and function can be calculated.
Subsequently the centroids for each type can be determined and
every subject can be classified based upon the distance to the cen-
troids of each type. We use leave-one-out predictions by repeating
the mentioned analyses n times with n  1 subjects (i.e., the subject
to be classified is not involved in the estimation of the discriminant
functions) and we use equal priors, that is, we assume a 33.3% proba-
bility to be of either type. Discriminant analyses were calculated in
SPSS (version 25).
3 | RESULTS
3.1 | Frequency of the behavioral types
The behavioral data consists of 102 participants in the role of the
potential punisher. With our design, we can identify distinct types of
third-party punishment, that is, independent punishers, conditional
punishers and nonpunishers. We find that 19.6% participants are
independent punishers, 24.5% are conditional punishers, and 55.9%
chose not to punish at all (Figure 2a). Note that, we use the subscripts
Indep for Independent Punishers, Cond for Conditional Punishers, and
Non for Nonpunishers in the analysis section.
3.2 | Characterization of the behavioral types with
psychometric ratings
In order to characterize the behavioral types, we explored the relation
between the types, the perception of unfairness, and the agreement
with different statements about the underlying motives. We use uni-
variate ANOVAs with between-subject factor behavioral types for the
analyses and subsequent post-hoc independent t-tests.
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All participants first had to indicate how unfair they perceived the
behavior of the defecting second mover in the PD (on a 5-point Likert
scale, 1 = very unfair, 5 = very fair). Even though the third-parties
behaved differently (and are of different types), the perception of
unfairness did not differ between the three types (F(2,99) = 2.05,
p = .134). In fact, all types considered the behavior of a defecting sec-
ond mover as very unfair (all means are below 1.9, see Figure 2b). Fur-
ther, all participants also indicated their agreement on a variety of
statements (eight statements, on a 5-point Likert-scale, 1 = no agree-
ment, 5 = full agreement) targeted at specific motives underlying the
punishment choice. In order to control for multiple comparisons, we
applied a Bonferroni correction (0.05/8 = 0.00625, see Section 2) and
report in the manuscript only motives that survived this correction
procedure (Table S1 for the statistical analyses to all eight motive
statements). We find that the three types differed in their agreement
about whether “the second mover in the PD violated a social norm”
(F(2,99) = 10.46, p = .0001, eta
2 = 0.17). Independent punishers agreed
almost entirely with the motive statement and nonpunishers only mod-
erately, with conditional punishers being in-between (meanIndep = 4.3,
meanCond = 3.52, and meanNon = 2.96). Post-hoc independent t-tests
confirmed the difference in pairwise comparisons (pIndep vs. Cond = .016,
pIndep vs. Non <.0001, pCond vs. Non = .047, see Figure 2c). The behavioral
types also differed in their opinion on whether “the deduction of points
helps no one” (F(2,99) = 11.85, p <.0001, eta2 = 0.19). Here, non-
punishers agreed to a very large degree and more than both conditional
and independent punishers (meanNon = 4.26, meanCond = 3.24,
meanIndep = 3.05; pCond vs. Non = .0004, pIndep vs. Non = .0001), while
independent punishers and conditional punishers only agreed moder-
ately with no significant differences between those two types (pIndep
vs. Cond = .610, see Figure 2c). Further, we also asked whether the “own
choice was the morally correct thing to do.” Independent punishers
agreed most (55% of which agreed entirely) followed by conditional
punishers and nonpunishers (meanIndep = 4.25, meanCond = 3.60,
meanNon = 2.84; F(2,99) = 10.98, p < 0.0001, eta
2 = 0.18; pIndep
vs. Cond = .050, pIndep vs. Non = .0001, pCond vs. Non = .012, see Figure 2c).
Thus, the three behavioral types agreed to different degrees with the
motives that we expected to be important based upon the description
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F IGURE 2 Percentage of behavioral types and psychometric ratings of unfairness and motives. The bar graph in (a) illustrates the percentage
of the observed behavioral types: independent punishers (19.6%), conditional punishers (24.5%) and nonpunishers (55.9%). The bar graph in
(b) illustrates that all three types perceived the defecting behavior of the second mover in the PD as very unfair. The bar graph in (c) illustrates
that the three types differed in their agreement with several motive statements, that is, whether the second mover violated a social norm,
whether the deduction of points does not help and whether the own choice was the morally correct thing to do (all univariate ANOVAs: p <.001).
The bar graph in (d) illustrates that conditional punishers showed a moderate to high agreement on motive statements about collective action and
shared responsibility, which are thought to play a role for this particular type. Independent punishers are depicted in red, conditional punishers in
green and nonpunishers in gray color (see color legend). Error bars depict 95% confidence intervals
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Finally, we explored to what extent the motives for participating
in collective actions apply to conditional punishers. Note that, only
conditional punishers answered these motive statements because
they target specific aspects of conditional behavior. Here, we find that
conditional punishers demonstrated a moderate to high agreement on
the three motives, providing further evidence for the correct classifi-
cation of this type. More specifically, conditional punishers agreed
moderately with the motives of helping the deducting person (“I
wanted to help the people deducting points by lowering the costs for
them,” mean = 3.2, SD = 1.22) and not wanting to punish all by them-
selves (“I did not want to be the only person to deduct points,”
mean = 3.2, SD = 1.32). Further, conditional punishers agreed most
with the motive “it was morally correct to support someone who
decided to deduct points” (mean = 3.72, SD = 0.98, see Figure 2d).
So far, we characterized the types based on each motive indepen-
dently. In order to provide a more integrative view, we will now
explore whether and to what extent we can classify a participant
based upon the motives using a discriminant analysis and leave-one-
out predictions (see Figure 4a). Note that only the eight motives all
participants answered could be used in this analysis. In a first step, the
analysis kept only those motives that explain sufficient variance by
minimizing Wilk's Lambda. Three out of 8 motives survive this first
step and these motives explain 37.7% of the variance in the three
types. The three motives are the same as discussed above (also dis-
played in Figure 2c) and are used to create two discriminant functions,
which separate the types maximally. Figure 4a shows both function
scores for each subject and the centroids for each type. The first and
second function combined are significant (χ2 = 46.4, p <.001) while
the second function itself is not (χ2 = 1.96, p = .375). The first func-
tion yields negative (standardized) coefficients for the motive state-
ments concerning the moral correctness of the own choice (.53) and
the perceived norm violation of the second mover (0.52), and yields
a positive (standardized) coefficient for agreeing that deducting points
does not help (.58). As can be inferred from Figure 4a, the first func-
tion is especially good at discriminating the nonpunishers and inde-
pendent punishers. We classify each participant using leave-one-out
predictions. In total, 60.8% of subjects are classified correctly, which
is considerably better than the 33.3% chance level. More specifically,
65% of independent punishers, 28% of conditional punishers and
73.7% of nonpunishers are classified correctly (see Figure 4a). This
suggests that the motives are particularly good at classifying non-
punishers and independent punishers.
3.3 | Characterization of the behavioral types with
structural brain characteristics
To explore whether the three types can be characterized by distinct
neural signatures, we performed quantitative morphometric analyses
of T1-weighted anatomical images using VBM implemented in the
computational anatomy toolbox (CAT 12). VBM is a whole brain tech-
nique capable of discovering subtle, regionally specific changes in gray
matter volume (see material and methods for details).
We applied univariate analysis of variance (ANOVA) in SPM
12 with gray matter volume as dependent variable and behavioral
types (independent punishers, conditional punishers, and non-
punishers) as between-subject factor. We controlled in the analysis
for individual brain size, gender, and age, as is required in volumetric
analyses. In order to control for multiple comparisons, we used non-
parametric permutation statistics based on threshold-free cluster
enhancement (see Section 2 for details). Findings revealed that three
brain areas showed volumetric differences (at p <.05, SV-FWE
corrected) between the three behavioral types (Figure 3a–d), including
the right TPJ (TPJ: x = 47, y = 66, z = 35, peak F-value: 17.71, peak
TFCE-value: 21099), the right DLPFC (DLPFC: x = 45, y = 11, z = 44,
peak F-value = 14.31, peak TFCE-value: 10966), and the bilateral dor-
sal caudate (left caudate: x = 14, y = 6, z = 23, peak F-value:
19.48, peak TFCE-value: 29133; right caudate: x = 20, y = 3,
z = 23, peak F-value: 14.84, peak TFCE-value: 11233). In order to
explore the direction and specificity of the observed anatomical dif-
ferences, we extracted the gray matter volume values from these sig-
nificant regions (for the extraction thresholded at p <.001,
uncorrected), regressed out age, gender and individual brain size (the
covariates of no interest), and conducted post-hoc pairwise compari-
son in SPSS. Below we report the findings of parametric statistics. See
Table S2 for nonparametric statistics. Notably, all findings hold,
irrespective of whether we conduct parametric or nonparametric
tests.
Pairwise comparisons between the three behavioral types rev-
ealed a distinctive pattern in the right TPJ, right DLPFC and bilateral
dorsal caudate. As shown in Figure 3a, independent punishers demon-
strated larger gray matter volume in the right TPJ (in the area of the
angular gyrus) than both conditional punishers (F(1,43) = 12.48,
p = .001, eta2 = 0.225) and nonpunishers (F(1,75) = 11.66, p = .001,
eta2 = 0.135). Conditional punishers and nonpunishers did not differ
significantly with respect to gray matter volume in the right TPJ
(F(1,80) = 0.531, p = .468, eta
2 = 0.007).
As shown in Figure 3b, conditional punishers demonstrated larger
gray matter volume in the right DLPFC than independent punishers
(F(1,43) = 13.31, p = .001, eta
2 = 0.236) and nonpunishers
(F(1,80) = 7.62, p = .007, eta
2 = 0.087). Independent punishers and
nonpunishers did not differ significantly with respect to gray matter
volume in the right DLPFC (F(1,75) = 1.42, p = .237, eta
2 = 0.019).
Finally, as shown in Figure 3c/d, conditional punishers demon-
strated lower gray matter volume in the bilateral dorsal caudate than
both independent punishers (left caudate: F(1,43) = 16.57, p <.001,
eta2 = 0.278; right caudate: F(1,43) = 8.72, p = .005, eta
2 = 0.169) and
nonpunishers (left caudate: F(1,80) = 7.86, p = .006, eta
2 = 0.090; right
caudate: F(1,80) = 6.973, p = .010, eta
2 = 0.080). Independent pun-
ishers and nonpunishers did not differ significantly with respect to
gray matter volume in the bilateral caudate (left caudate:
F(1,75) = 2.52, p = .116, eta
2 = 0.033; right caudate: F(1,75) = 1.29,
p = .259, eta2 = 0.017).
As for the motive statements, we conducted a discriminant analy-
sis with the extracted gray matter volume values of the four discov-
ered brain areas (adjusted for brain size, age, and gender) in order to
8 BAUMGARTNER ET AL.
provide a more integrative view and to examine how good each indi-
vidual participant can be classified. When we employ the discriminant
analysis, the right TPJ, right DLPFC, and the left caudate add suffi-
cient explanatory power (based on Wilks' lambda), resulting in the
exclusion of the right caudate. The three included areas explain 30.6%
of the variance in the three behavioral types and are used to create
two discriminant functions, which separate the types maximally.
Figure 4b shows both function scores for each subject and the cen-
troids for each type. The first function and the second function com-
bined are significant (χ2 = 35.73, p <.001) while the second function
itself is not (χ2 = 4.311, p = .116). The first function yields positive
(standardized) coefficients for the right TPJ (.58) and the left caudate
(.59) and a negative (standardized) coefficient for the right DLPFC


























































































































































































F IGURE 3 Structural brain
characteristics in the right TPJ,
right DLPFC and bilateral caudate
demonstrate significant
differences between the three
behavioral types. Depicted in
(a) are the structural differences
in the right TPJ (SV-FWE
corrected at p <.05), which were
qualified by larger gray matter
volume in independent punishers
compared to the other two
behavioral types. Depicted in
(b) are the structural differences
in the right DLPFC (SV-FWE
corrected at p <.05), which were
qualified by larger gray matter
volume in conditional punishers
compared to the two other
behavioral types. Depicted in
(c/d) are the structural
differences in the left and right
dorsal caudate (SV-FWE
corrected at p <.05), which are
qualified by larger gray matter
volume in both independent
punishers and nonpunishers
compared to conditional
punishers. Note that for display
purposes, all SV-FWE corrected
findings (based on the univariate
ANOVA) are depicted at an
uncorrected p-value (p <.001)
using F-maps. Bar graphs
illustrate gray matter volume
values based on the depicted
regions (encompassing all voxels
at a p-value of <.001, as
displayed), broken down for the
three behavioral types. These
values are adjusted for the
covariates of no interests
(individual brain size, age, and
gender) and z-standardized.
Independent punishers are
depicted in red, conditional
punishers in green and
nonpunishers in gray color (see
color legend). Error bars depict
95% confidence intervals
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function is especially good at discriminating conditional punishers and
independent punishers. The leave-one-out predictions yield a total of
47.1% of subjects being classified correctly, which is better than the
33.3% chance level. More specifically, 65% of independent punishers,
60% of conditional punishers and 35.1% of nonpunishers are correctly
classified (see Figure 4b). In contrast to the motives, structural brain
characteristics seem to be better at classifying conditional punishers
but less good at classifying nonpunishers.
Finally, to complete the picture, we employed a discriminate anal-
ysis with all eight motive statements and four brain areas (using the
extracted and adjusted gray matter volume measures). Notably, all the
motives and brain areas included in the other two discriminant ana-
lyses also yield sufficient discriminating power to be included in the
combined motive and brain analysis (using Wilks' lambda for the inclu-
sion of predictors). These six predictors explain 56.5% of the variance
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F IGURE 4 Discriminant
analyses based on motives and
structural brain characteristics.
Depicted in (a) are the results of
the discriminant analysis calculated
with the motive statements.
Depicted in (b) are the results of
the discriminant analysis calculated
with the structural brain
characteristics depicted in Figure 3,
using the extracted gray matter
volume values of the right TPJ,
right DLPFC, and left caudate
(adjusted for brain size, age, and
gender). Depicted in (c) are the
results of the discriminant analysis
calculated with both the motive
statements and structural brain
characteristics. The scatterplots
illustrate the estimated
discriminant functions and the
discriminant scores of each
individual subject (slightly jittered),
together with the centroids of each
behavioral type (squares). The bar
graphs depict the classification
accuracy (in %) for each behavioral
type and for all types together.
Note that, each participant was
classified using leave-one-out
predictions. Independent punishers
are depicted in red, conditional
punishers in green, and
nonpunishers in gray, and all types
in blue (see color legend)
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both function scores for each subject and the centroids for each type.
The first and second function combined are significant (χ2 = 80.438,
p <.001) and the second function itself is also significant (χ2 = 27.629,
p <.001). The first function is mainly affected by the negative (stan-
dardized) coefficient for the motive of “deduction does help no one”
(.417) and positive (standardized) coefficients for the right TPJ
(.462), the perceived norm violation of the second mover (.444), and
the moral correctness of the own choice (.567). As can be inferred
from Figure 4c, the first function distinguishes independent punishers
and nonpunishers well. The second function is mainly affected by the
positive (standardized) coefficient for the right DLPFC (.524) and neg-
ative (standardized) coefficient for the left caudate (.582). As can be
inferred from Figure 4c, the second function discriminates between
conditional punishers and the other two behavioral types. The leave-
one-out predictions show that at least 60% of every type are correctly
classified, with a total accuracy of 63.7% (which is better than the
33.3% chance level). Here, 70% of independent punishers, 60% of
conditional punishers and 63.2% of nonpunishers are correctly classi-
fied (see Figure 4c). Thus, it seems that the combination of both struc-
tural brain characteristics and motives is particularly well suited to
classify the three behavioral types.
4 | DISCUSSION
Third-party punishment has proven to be a valuable mechanism to
enforce norms, increase cooperation rates and to deter free-riders
(Fehr & Fischbacher, 2004). The literature on the typology of third-
party punishment behavior has so far differentiated only between
punishers and nonpunishers and neglected that there are different
types of punishers, that is, punishers can be further subdivided into
initiators and joiners. To fill this gap, we designed a novel third-
party punishment paradigm that allows identifying these distinct
punishers. We found that slightly more than half of the subjects
(55%) never punished, while the other half of the subjects were
divided into independent (20%) and conditional (25%) punishers. By
using a neural trait approach, we were able to characterize these
three types by their neural signature and shed light on possible
underlying psychological mechanisms and motives. Our results
showed that independent punishers were characterized by larger
gray matter volume in the right TPJ compared to both other types.
Further, we found that both independent punishers and non-
punishers were characterized by larger gray matter volume in bilat-
eral caudate than conditional punishers. Finally, only conditional
punishers were characterized by larger gray matter volume in the
right DLPFC. These structural differences were paralleled by differ-
ences in subjective motives underlying the punishment choices. To
get an integrative view, we used discriminant analyses to classify
the types in leave-one-out predictions. We found that anatomical
brain characteristics are able to classify roughly half of the subjects
into the correct types, while a combination of both brain character-
istics and motives performs best and classifies more than 60% of
subjects correctly.
The TPJ, in particular in the area of the right angular gyrus, has
been shown to play a crucial role in social cognition, such as
mentalizing, perspective-taking, or self-other distinction (Carter &
Huettel, 2013; Frith & Frith, 2012; Lamm, Bukowski, & Silani, 2016;
Steinbeis, 2016). Further, third-party punishment studies have consis-
tently shown that mentalizing processes during the punishment deci-
sion are associated with this part of the TPJ (e.g., Baumgartner,
Schiller, Rieskamp, Gianotti, & Knoch, 2013; Buckholtz et al., 2008;
Gerfo et al., 2019; Ginther et al., 2016). Our findings showing that
independent punishers have a larger TPJ than the other two types
complements previous fMRI research and provides first evidence that
larger gray matter volume in the right TPJ increases third-parties' pro-
pensity to punish norm transgressors, possibly due to an increased
capacity for social cognition that helps independent punishers to men-
talize with the victim and to represent the victim's needs and appreci-
ation. On a broader perspective, this structural finding in the right TPJ
also complements studies in related fields on altruistic and coopera-
tive choices (Baumgartner et al., 2019; Gianotti, Dahinden,
Baumgartner, & Knoch, 2019; Morishima et al., 2012). These studies
provide evidence that task-independent brain characteristics (struc-
ture and baseline activation) in the right TPJ are associated with altru-
istic choices in the dictator game and cooperative choices in the
public goods game. It seems that similar neural traits in the right TPJ
are associated with the inclination of third-parties to behave altruisti-
cally and to initiate punishment of wrongdoers even if no one else
punishes.
In addition to larger gray matter volume in the right TPJ, indepen-
dent punishers were further characterized by larger gray matter vol-
ume in the bilateral caudate compared to conditional punishers.
Interestingly, nonpunishers had similar structural brain characteristics
in the bilateral caudate as independent punishers and also showed sig-
nificant differences compared to conditional punishers. This might
seem puzzling at first sight: Why do these two types, who demon-
strate diametrically opposed punishment choices, have similar struc-
tural characteristics in the bilateral caudate? The caudate is an
important part of the reward system (Rademacher, Schulte-Rüther,
Hanewald, & Lammertz, 2015). Processing rewards plays a major role
in goal-directed behavior and motivation. The caudate is implicated in
the processing of rewards that accrue as a result of goal-directed
behavior or decisions (e.g., Brassen, Gamer, Peters, Gluth, &
Buchel, 2012; Delgado, 2007; O'Doherty et al., 2004). Importantly,
the caudate encodes both nonsocial (monetary) and social rewards in
the same area (Gu et al., 2019; Izuma, Saito, & Sadato, 2008; Wake &
Izuma, 2017). For example, the caudate has been shown to encode
social rewards in diverse situations, such as mutually cooperating with
other individuals (Park et al., 2017; Rilling et al., 2002), getting a fair
offer (Tabibnia, Satpute, & Lieberman, 2008), punishing unfairness in
the role of a second-party (De Quervain, Fischbacher, Treyer, &
Schellhammer, 2004) and third-party (Baumgartner et al., 2012; Hu
et al., 2015; Strobel et al., 2011), and giving charitable donations
(Harbaugh, Mayr, & Burghart, 2007; Moll et al., 2006). Similarly,
numerous studies using diverse nonsocial paradigms (e.g., lotteries,
gambling tasks, slot machine tasks, etc.) have shown a role of the
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caudate in encoding nonsocial monetary rewards (e.g., Arsalidou,
Vijayarajah, & Sharaev, 2020; Bjork, Smith, Chen, & Hommer, 2010;
Brassen et al., 2012; Hardin, Pine, & Ernst, 2009; Hosking
et al., 2017). Collectively, the reviewed literature lead us to speculate
that the increased volume in the bilateral caudate in independent pun-
ishers as well as nonpunishers (compared to conditional punishers)
indicate an increased inclination to seek rewards (social or nonsocial)
as a driving force in decision-making, possibly due to an increased
capacity of the reward system to influence goal-directed behavior.
But, why are independent punishers motivated by social rewards,
whereas nonpunishers are more motivated by nonsocial (monetary
rewards)? Here a recent neuroimaging study by Park and colleagues is
enlightening (Park et al., 2017). It showed that generous choices are
associated with enhanced functional connectivity between the TPJ
and reward-related areas in the caudate. Thus, it is conceivable that
the observed volumetric differences in the TPJ between independent
punishers and nonpunishers (as discussed above) might explain why
independent punishers are motivated by social rewards, whereas non-
punishers are motivated by nonsocial (monetary) rewards. Summing
up, decision-making in these two behavioral types seems to be driven
by strong preferences for rewards (social or nonsocial)—an interpreta-
tion that is further strengthened by the self-reported punishment
motives: Whereas nonpunishers agreed highly with the notion that
punishment does not help and only reduces monetary payment, inde-
pendent punishers vastly agreed that the second mover has violated a
social norm and that punishing him/her is the morally correct
thing to do.
So far, we were able to characterize independent punishers and
nonpunishers with structural brain characteristics of the TPJ and bilat-
eral caudate and argued that both types might be inclined to seek
rewards as the driving force in decision-making. In contrast, these
structural brain patterns were not characteristic of conditional pun-
ishers, and therefore decision-making in this type might not (or to a
lesser extent) be driven by social or monetary rewards. Thus, the
question arises: What is the driver of those who prefer to condition
their own punishment choice on whether another person punishes?
Why do they prefer to punish collectively and thereby risk that pun-
ishment might not occur at all? In their conceptual framework El Zein
et al. (2019) propose that collective decisions have several advantages
over sole decisions. They allow minimizing the material and psycho-
logical burden of an individual's responsibility and shield collective
decision-makers from the consequences of negative outcomes. This
conceptual framework fits our case. Conditional punishers are part of
the norm-enforcement and they help the other punisher(s), while
sharing the blame and costs for punishing if punishment is
implemented. If no punishment is implemented, conditional punishers
can keep up a self-image of behaving altruistically by showing a gen-
eral willingness to participate in the punishment of unfair behavior,
but also do not spend points and avoid being the sole punisher. Con-
ditional punishers' answers to the motives for collective actions and
shared responsibility are in line with these assumptions, that is, condi-
tional punishers indicated that they wanted to help the independent
punishers, but avoided being the sole punisher. In conclusion, it seems
that conditional punishment has a strong strategic component, which
optimizes the punishment choice for all potential situations. Interest-
ingly, there is strong evidence from task-dependent and task-
independent studies (structure and baseline activation) that the
DLPFC is involved in strategic decision-making (e.g., Crone &
Steinbeis, 2017; Gianotti et al., 2018; Ruff, Ugazio, & Fehr, 2013;
Soutschek et al., 2015; Spitzer et al., 2007; Steinbeis et al., 2012;
Strang et al., 2014), and that the functional role of the DLPFC in stra-
tegic decision-making involves aspects of self-control, that is, a strate-
gic decision often involves some kind of sacrifice, for example, money
or time. Thus, we speculate that the larger volume in the right DLPFC
in conditional punishers (compared to the other two types) might indi-
cate that their decision is more influenced by strategic considerations,
possibly due to an increased capacity for self-control processes and
strategic reasoning. This increased capacity might allow them to
implement strategies of behavior that minimize the material burden
(costs) as well as the psychological burden (feeling bad if not partici-
pating in punishment).
Since we explored a novel punishment typology, we also investi-
gated the out-of-sample classification accuracy of the structural brain
characteristics and motives. To this end, we used discriminant ana-
lyses, first by classifying based upon either brain characteristics or
motives, and then combining both data. Each dataset, on its own, is
able to capture two of the three punishment types with an accuracy
of at least 60%, but neither is better than chance at discriminating the
remaining type. Combining the two data sets leads to correct classifi-
cation of 63.7% of all subjects, and each behavioral type is classified
with an accuracy of at least 60%, which is nearly double as high as a
naïve baseline (33%). Thus, with the help of structural brain character-
istics and psychometric motives, we were able to correctly classify
individual subjects into distinct behavioral types, going beyond the
exploration of average differences between behavioral types.
To corroborate the interpretation of the anatomical brain findings
and to allow more specific and mechanistic conclusions, future
research could additionally acquire neuropsychological test batteries
(e.g., cognitive abilities and strategic reasoning) or social and affective
decision-making measures (e.g., mentalizing, self-other distinction, and
reaction to rewards).
Summing up, our findings reveal a typology of punishers that can
be characterized by structural brain characteristics associated with
social cognition, reward processing, behavioral control, and strategic
reasoning. In order to increase participation in third-party punishment
(or to decrease the second-order free-rider problem) it would be nec-
essary to shift some of the considerably numerous nonpunishers to
be conditional or independent punishers. Obvious ways for shifting
nonpunishers would include making punishment less harmful or
costly. Other ways could be to use specific behavioral trainings
(e.g., mentalizing training, meditation, and working memory training)
or neuro-modulation techniques (e.g., brain stimulation and
neurofeedback). These trainings and techniques have been demon-
strated to improve social cognition (e.g., Santiesteban et al., 2012;
Santiesteban, Banissy, Catmur, & Bird, 2012) and strategic reasoning/
behavioral control capacities (e.g., Anguera et al., 2013; Houben,
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Dassen, & Jansen, 2016; Kouijzer, de Moor, Gerrits, Congedo, & van
Schie, 2009) and to change underlying structural brain characteristics in
the TPJ and DLPFC (e.g., Jausovec & Jausovec, 2012; Klimecki
et al., 2019; Valk et al., 2017). Thus, it is conceivable that behavioral
trainings and neuro-modulation techniques that target the brain areas
involved in social cognition and strategic reasoning could help to increase
the number of punishers, be it conditional or independent, thereby pro-
moting the enforcements of social norms via third-party punishment.
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